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I. INTRODUCTION
Our partitioned constitutional system is intended to make each branch
of government serve as “the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.”1  This system of checks and balances reflects humanity’s imper-
fect nature2 as the strong and the powerful, where unrestrained, will tend
towards abuse of the weak and the powerless.  “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary.”3  The purpose of this paper is to expose
* Author is a partner with De Mott, McChesney, Curtright & Armenda´riz, LLP,
where he practices law before administrative and federal courts in defense of the legal
rights of non-citizens.  He holds a Juris Doctorate from the University of Texas School of
Law.  Prior to joining DMCA, he litigated federal civil rights cases with the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights under Law of Texas.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed. 1898); see also U.S.
CONST. arts. I, II, III (authorizing executive, legislative and judicial powers).
2. In Federalist 51, Alexander Hamilton rhetorically asked “what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note
1.
3. Id.
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an area of unrestrained governmental authority Border Patrol’s use of
illegal roving patrols; to succinctly explain the factual and procedural cir-
cumstances that enable the Border Patrol to abuse its power to conduct
roving patrols with relative impunity; and to suggest a modest judicial
ameliorative measure to help keep the Border Patrol in its place or, at a
minimum, to mitigate some of the resulting damage.  The suggested mea-
sure is the adoption of an evidentiary rule in immigration removal pro-
ceedings whereby any testimony proffered by a respondent4 to
demonstrate that the government illegally obtained its evidence of alien-
age in the case-in-chief would be inadmissible as evidence against the re-
spondent on the issue of removability.
The Border Patrol is a federal law enforcement agency created by regu-
lation5 to execute the border enforcement powers authorized by the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA).6  The Border Patrol, whose
functions were previously performed by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS), is now part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).7
The Border Patrol is assigned enforcement duties between ports of entry,
and the CBP inspectors are assigned duties at ports of entry.8  Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE), another agency within DHS, is
tasked with immigration enforcement in the U.S. interior.9
The Border Patrol is flush with money and manpower.  Due to a sharp
rise in federal funding for border enforcement, the federal government
has greatly increased the number of Border Patrol agents.10  For fiscal
year 2011, CBP had a projected goal of more than 21,000 Border Patrol
4. A person in removal proceedings is generally referred to as a “respondent.”
5. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(b)(1) (2010).
6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006).
The INA was enacted in 1952, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 , Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), and has been amended many
times over the years.  The INA is also contained in, and therefore has parallel but differ-
ently numbered cites in, the United States Code (U.S.C.).  For present purposes, an effort
will be made to include both cites for ease of reference.
7. OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, NA-
TIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY 4 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/dhs/national_bp_strategy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL BORDER PATROL
STRATEGY].
8. Id.; CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE
OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 7 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/RL32562.pdf.
9. NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 13.
10. HADDAL, supra note 8, at 2.
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agents.11  This more than doubles the number of agents employed in
2004.12  The vast majority of its agents are assigned to the Border Patrol
sectors13 along the southern border of the United States abutting Mex-
ico.14  This tremendous increase in manpower has allowed the Border Pa-
trol to increase its roving patrols,15 which are one part of the Border
Patrol’s overall strategy for immigration enforcement.  The Border Patrol
says it has a “three-tiered, defense-in-depth strategy” to secure the bor-
der between ports of entry involving “the use of line-watch operations on
the border, roving patrol operations near the border, and traffic check-
points on highways leading away from the border.”16  At the border.
Near the border. Leading away from the border.  As it does here, the
eponymous agency generally defends its sphere of activities as involving
or being in relation to the actual border.17  The problem is that the Bor-
der Patrol is actually engaged in roving patrol operations at a greater
distance from the border than its own regulations appear to contemplate.
More to the point, its modus operandi often appears to be to conduct
these operations in a manner that clearly violates not only its own operat-
ing regulations but also applicable statutory law and constitutional limita-
11. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY
2012, at CBP S&E-60 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congres-
sional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf.
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Southwest Border Next
Steps (June 23, 2010) (available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1277310093825.
shtm).
13. The Border Patrol allocates its resources to areas of the country termed “sectors.”
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2010, at 6 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/
publications/admin/fy2010_report.ctt/fy2010_report.pdf [hereinafter CBP ANNUAL FINAN-
CIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010]; Border Patrol Sectors, CBP.GOV, http://www.cbp.gov/
xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_sectors/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
Each sector is led by a Chief Patrol Agent and each sector is “divided into stations, led by a
Patrol Agent in Charge,” responsible for operations within his or her sector area. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-824, BORDER PATROL: CHECKPOINTS CON-
TRIBUTE TO BORDER PATROL’S MISSION, BUT MORE CONSISTENT DATA COLLECTION AND
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT COULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 5 n.7 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09824.pdf [hereinafter GAO-09-824].
14. See GAO-09-824, supra note 13 (“As of June 2009, the Border Patrol had 19,354
agents nationwide, an increase of [fifty-seven] percent since September 2006. Of these
agents, about [eighty-eight] percent (17,011) were located in the nine Border Patrol sectors
along the southwest border.”).
15. Leslie Berestein, Border Patrol’s Stops Are Criticized, U-T SAN DIEGO, Mar. 1,
2009, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2009/mar/01/1m1enforce22436-border-patrols-
stops-are-criticize/.
16. CBP ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 13, at 17.
17. NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 2 (“The National Border
Patrol Strategy has an ambitious goal: operational control of our nation’s border, and par-
ticularly our borders with Mexico and Canada.”).
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tions.  The predictable result is a degraded agency, racial profiling, and
unlawful seizures of the undocumented,18 of non-citizens with legal sta-
tus, and of U.S. citizens.  The principle underlying reason for this abuse of
power (beyond our imperfect human nature) is uncomplicated—the Bor-
der Patrol is insufficiently restrained.  There are neither adequate internal
nor sufficient external restraints on the exercise of its powers.  It has been
left to self-regulate and this experiment has been a failure, but a failure
that largely goes unnoticed because of the legal and factual context in
which the Border Patrol operates.
The issue here addressed is particularly timely given the present
cacophony of calls for the greater participation of state and local police
authorities in immigration enforcement, calls which have been rightly
criticized as exhortations to invidious racial profiling.  A look at how even
the Border Patrol—the purported expert agency at lawful immigration
enforcement—is unable to conduct roving patrols without racial profiling
reveals that any person committed to the rule of law should not be ad-
verse to asking the state and local police authorities to do the same.
II. THE PROBLEM: RAMPANT UNLAWFUL ROVING BORDER
PATROL STOPS
On January 5, 2010, Javier Z.19 was driving to work on Interstate High-
way 35 North in Schertz, Texas, which is just north of San Antonio and
approximately 167 miles from Piedras Negras, Mexico, the nearest border
crossing.  He was in a red double-cab truck with two other Latino co-
workers.20  He was driving in accordance with the traffic law and there
was nothing visually unusual or indicative of illegal activity about Javier,
his passengers, or his truck.  Nevertheless, Border Patrol agents in two
separate Border Patrol vehicles acting in concert pulled him over, ques-
tioned him and his companions about their immigration status, and ar-
rested them.21  The agents involved were Rolando S., Francisco D., and
18. The term “undocumented” is used here to refer generally to all non-citizens with-
out current governmental permission to be in the United States, without regard to immi-
gration history or manner of entry.  The use of the term “illegal” is avoided throughout this
article for several reasons, not least of which because it is ungrammatical and ontologically
nonsensical.
19. Javier and most of the other persons mentioned in this article who were arrested
by Border Patrol were clients of the author.  The names of clients referenced in this article
will be redacted although some of their names are a matter of public record due to federal
court litigation.
20. Affidavit of Javier Z. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues).  This account is taken from Javier’s sworn statement made in litigation.
21. Id.
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Ernest L.22  On the return trip to the office, the agents stopped and ar-
rested other persons in the same fashion.23  In documents later produced
during litigation, the agents claimed that they stopped Javier because they
could see him and two of his companions as they drove past the agents’
stationary vehicle.  They noticed Javier’s unspecified “body posture”;
Javier and his companions “appeared to be startled”; Javier and the
others were “looking straight ahead” and “never acknowledged” the
agents;24 Javier’s vehicle “slowed down abrup[tly]” after the Border Pa-
trol agents pulled their vehicle in behind them; and, finally, an unspeci-
fied passenger “made a sudden move to take off his seatbelt.”25
In the early evening of March 19, 2007, Jose O. was driving by himself
in an Isuzu Rodeo sport utility vehicle on Loop 410 West in San Antonio
when he was stopped by Border Patrol agents, Rolando S. and Ernest
B.26  San Antonio is approximately 146 miles from the nearest border
port of entry.  According to the government’s account, the Border Patrol
agents stopped him because he was “always looking straight ahead,” he
looked “nervous,” and he was “switching lanes quickly.”27  The Border
Patrol agents questioned him about his immigration status and arrested
him.28  Under oath, Agent Rolando S. testified that he stopped people
based on their facial expressions and how they reacted to the Border Pa-
22. Throughout this Article, names of law enforcement agents will be redacted al-
though many of their names are a matter of public record on account of federal court
proceedings.
23. Affidavit of Javier Z., supra note 20.
24. Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Javier Z. (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).  This leads one to question: Did
the agents expect them to wave?
25. Javier was ultimately deported, but not because his arrest was legal; rather, the
government was able to convince the immigration judge that it had evidence of alienage
untainted by the arrest.  On account of his illegal arrest, Javier filed suit pursuant to Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346(b) and 2671, against the U.S. government and the agents
involved in his illegal arrest.  The documents referenced here consist of a government
Form I-213, also known as a Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, and accompanying
addendums.  Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Javier Z., supra note
24.  The Form I-213 is denominated the “Record of Deportable Alien.” Id. It is the form
that an immigration agent fills out after an alien is arrested. Id. Its purpose, besides identi-
fying the basis of the government’s encounter with the person arrested, is to record identi-
fying and biographical information as well as other facts such as manner of entry into the
United States, along with criminal history. Id.
26. Affidavit of Jose O. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).  This account is taken from a sworn statement taken during removal proceedings.
27. Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Jose O. (on file with The
Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
28. Written Decision of the Immigration Judge, case of Jose O. (on file with The
Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
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trol vehicle.29  The agent claimed to be able to tell that Jose was nervous
because of the way Jose, while driving, was “clenching” the steering
wheel.30  The agent could not explain how he could distinguish one His-
panic person from an “illegal alien” given the high Hispanic population in
San Antonio.31  The immigration judge found the agent’s testimony lack-
ing in credibility.  The judge concluded “that the only basis for the agent’s
stop was that [Jose] ‘looked like an alien’” and that, in arresting Jose in
an act of racial profiling, Agent Rolando S. “deliberately violated the law
or acted in conscious disregard of the Constitution.”32  The judge threw
out the resulting evidence and terminated the removal proceeding against
Jose because there was no other evidence of alienage.33
On November 25, 2008, Melchor R. was with three other Latino men in
a double-cab Ford F-250 truck on Interstate Highway 10 just outside San
Antonio when he was stopped and arrested by Border Patrol Agents
Francisco D. and Rolando S.34  In documentation arising from the arrest,
the officers claim to have arrested Melchor and the other men in the
truck because they appeared to be “stoic and extremely nervous.”35
Agent Rolando S. was apparently undeterred by the immigration judge’s
prior decision in the case of Jose O. wherein the judge had ruled his con-
duct to be in deliberate violation or conscious disregard of the law.36  The
removal proceedings of Melchor R. are currently on-going.
One month after the arrest of Melchor R, on December 31, 2008, Bor-
der Patrol Agents Francisco D. and Ernest L. struck again.  Juan S. was
traveling in a four-door 1999 Ford 350 truck on Highway 151 in San
Antonio, Texas, with two other Latino men.37  The Border Patrol agents
pulled them off the freeway, questioned them as to their immigration sta-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Written Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 28.  The procedural
mechanics of removal proceedings in this context are explained in greater detail in Part III
below.
34. Affidavit of Melchor R. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Mi-
nority Issues).
35. Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Melchor R. (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
36. The immigration judge’s decision in the case of Jose O. was issued on February 14,
2008, nine months prior to the arrest of Melchor R. Compare Written Decision of the
Immigration Judge, supra note 28, with Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible
Alien of Melchor R., supra note 35.
37. Affidavit of Juan S. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).
2012] BORDER PATROL 559
tus, and arrested Juan.38  In documenting the arrest,39 the agents
rehashed the “stoic and nervous” excuse used in the case of Melchor R.:
On [December 31, 2008] at approximately [9:30 am] subject Juan [S.]
was apprehended by the San Antonio Border Patrol pursuant to a
vehicle stop.  Agents [Francisco D. and Ernest L.] were in their as-
signed area when they noticed a brown pickup carrying three passen-
gers pass them in their marked unit.  The passenger and driver
seemed stoic and nervous in their mannerisms when Agents [Fran-
cisco D. and Ernest L.] drove alongside them.  Agents [Francisco D.
and Ernest L.] decided to conduct a vehicle stop in order to conduct
a further review.40
The agents’ pretext for the arrest—appearing stoic and nervous—is in-
herently nonsensical.  It also is not original as it appears to be in wide-
spread use by Border Patrol agents.41  The removal proceedings of Juan
S. are currently on-going.
On January 15, 2009, Damian C. was in a double-cab truck with four
other Latino men when they were stopped by a Border Patrol agent on
Highway 87 outside San Angelo, Texas, which is northwest of San
Antonio.42  San Angelo is approximately 156 miles from the nearest bor-
der port of entry at Del Rio, Texas.  When Damian asked the arresting
agent why he was stopped, the agent told him that it was because of the
construction equipment that he had in his truck and because he looked
“Mexican.”43  The government arrest form gave no stated reason whatso-
ever for the stop.44  Subsequent to the taking of all evidence, the judge
found no other reason for the stop beyond “[Damian’s] Hispanic appear-
ance.”45  The judge threw out the resulting evidence and terminated the
removal proceeding against Damian.46
38. Id.
39. Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Juan S. (on file with The
Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
40. Id.
41. United States v. Alvarado, 635 F. Supp. 2d 586, 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (finding
illegal arrest where Border Patrol agent testified that he stopped a vehicle north of New
Braunfels, Texas because the driver appeared stoic and nervous).
42. Affidavit of Damian C. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Mi-
nority Issues).
43. Id.
44. Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Damian C. (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
45. Written Decision of the Immigration Judge, case of Damian C. (on file with The
Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
46. Id.
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On May 15, 2009, Israel H. and his friend Cesar ate breakfast at a res-
taurant near downtown San Antonio.47  Afterwards, they got into their
double-cab Dodge truck and drove onto Interstate Highway 10 East in
the direction of Seguin, Texas.48  They did not get very far before being
stopped by Border Patrol agents, including Agent Rolando S.49  He ques-
tioned Israel and his friend as to their immigration status and arrested
Israel.50  On the resulting arrest form, Agent Rolando claimed that Israel
was stopped because he and his companion had an “uncomfortable look-
ing forward stare” and because they “appeared very nervous.”51  Subse-
quent to the taking of all evidence, the judge found no other explanation
other than “[Israel’s] Hispanic appearance as the cause for the stop,”
warranting suppression of the evidence and termination of proceedings.52
On December 04, 2009, Luis Pablo P. was on Highway 87 leaving San
Angelo heading towards San Antonio.53  He was in a four-door flat-bed
truck with six others, all but one of whom were Latino, when they were
stopped by a border patrol agent for no apparent lawful reason.54  The
agent approached the vehicle and, without explaining the reason for the
stop, began asking each of them whether they had “papers.”55  Luis Pablo
remains in removal proceedings and no government documentation iden-
tifying the purported reasons for the stop has yet been produced.56
What do these arrested persons and factual scenarios have in common?
All the arrestees were Hispanic men.  All but one were stopped in the
greater San Antonio metropolitan area, the population of which is just
over 2.1 million, over fifty percent of which are “Hispanic or Latino,”
according to the latest census.57  All were stopped well over 100 miles
from the nearest port of entry on the U.S.–Mexico border.  All but one
was arrested while driving in a double cab or four-door truck; and accord-
47. Affidavit of Israel H. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minor-
ity Issues).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Written Decision of the Immigration Judge, case of Israel H. (on file with The
Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
51. Form I-213: Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien of Israel H. (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
52. Written Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 50.
53. Affidavit of Luis P. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Census 2010 P.L. 94-171 Profile — San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX Metro Area
(U50002360), PROXIMITYONE,  http://proximityone.com/cen2010/pl/plUS0002360.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2012).
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ing to their own accounts, they were driving in accordance with the traffic
law and there was nothing visually indicative of illegal activity that was
not also perfectly consistent with lawful activity.  The government docu-
mentation pertaining to the arrests includes statements by Border Patrol
agents claiming the vehicles were stopped because the occupants purport-
edly looked nervous, or stoic and nervous, or for other highly subjective
reasons.  Finally, as argued below, all of these arrests were illegal and
violated clearly established law.
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,58 the Supreme Court explained one reason
why the type of Border Patrol misconduct previously described happens
so frequently and with such impudence:
Every INS agent knows . . . that it is highly unlikely that any particu-
lar arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a
formal deportation proceeding.  When an occasional challenge is
brought, the consequences from the point of view of the officer’s
overall arrest and deportation record will be trivial.59
In other words, Border Patrol agents stop a lot of people, some of whom
they arrest; however, very few of those arrested persons challenge their
arrests and defend their constitutional rights, and even when the arrest is
challenged as unlawful, it will have no impact on the agent’s record.
Amazingly, the Court found this to be an argument against uniform appli-
cation of an exclusionary rule for constitutional violations in administra-
tive removal proceedings.60
The Court gave additional reasons for not extending a bright line exclu-
sionary rule to immigration proceedings, stating:
These regulations require that no one be detained without reasona-
ble suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested unless
there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence
thereof.  New immigration officers receive instruction and examina-
tion in Fourth Amendment law, and others receive periodic refresher
courses in law.  Evidence seized through intentionally unlawful con-
duct is excluded by Department of Justice policy from the proceed-
ing for which it was obtained.61
This means that the Border Patrol is self-regulating and can be trusted to
police itself.62  The aforementioned examples of Border Patrol miscon-
duct indicate that whatever policy may have been in place to restrain the
58. 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
59. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
60. Id. at 1034.
61. Id. at 1044-45 (internal citations omitted).
62. Hamilton would disagree. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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government from using evidence obtained from an agent’s unlawful con-
duct has long been abandoned.  For the Border Patrol it is, and has long
been, open season.
III. THE LAW AS IT RELATES TO ROVING BORDER PATROL STOPS
Whether they are respected or not, there exist constitutional, statutory,
and regulatory limits on the legal authority of Border Patrol agents to
detain and arrest persons.  On U.S. soil, the Fourth Amendment’s prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches and seizures and its warrant require-
ment upon probable cause arguably will generally apply equally to both
citizens and noncitizens.63  The statutory and regulatory provisions that
outline the limited authority of immigration agents to stop, detain, ques-
tion, and arrest certain persons are located at INA Section 236(a) (8
U.S.C. Section 1226(a)), providing for the arrest with warrant of any alien
subject to removal;64 INA Section 287(a) (8 U.S.C. Section 1357(a)), pro-
viding for warrantless arrests under certain circumstances;65 and 8 C.F.R.
Section 287.8(b), allowing “[i]nterrogation and detention not amounting
to arrest” and (c), detailing the “[c]onduct of arrests.”66  The Border Pa-
trol has no authority to stop people for actual or perceived violations of
the state traffic code.67  INA Section 287(a) and 8 C.F.R. Section 287.8
63. See Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 1096 (2006) (extending generally the protection of the Fourth Amendment against
unlawful arrest and the excessive use of force to non-citizens).
64. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(2006).
65. INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006).  This section, entitled, “Powers without
warrant,” reads in pertinent part:
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the
Attorney General shall have power without warrant—
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or
to remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter
the United States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of law
regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, or to arrest any
alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in
the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape
before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest . . .
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, to
board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United
States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle . . . .
Id.
66. 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.8(b), (c) (2010).
67. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975) (“Border Patrol
agents have no part in enforcing laws that regulate highway use, and their activities have
nothing to do with an inquiry whether motorists and their vehicles are entitled, by virtue of
compliance with laws governing highway usage, to be upon the public highways.”).
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are the non-constitutional provisions of law most relevant to our topic.
Section 287(a)(1) purports to allow Border Patrol agents to “interrogate”
any person believed to be an alien about his or her immigration status.68
To the extent the Border Patrol uses this provision as authority for con-
ducting Terry-stop type vehicular seizures;69 the Supreme Court requires
“reasonable suspicion” of alienage70 on the part of the agent beyond the
actual border or its functional equivalent.71  This “reasonable suspicion”
requirement is codified in 8 C.F.R. Section 287.8(b)(2):
If the immigration officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on spe-
cific articulable facts, that the person being questioned is, or is at-
tempting to be, engaged in an offense against the United States or is
an alien illegally in the United States, the immigration officer may
briefly detain the person for questioning.72
Moving beyond questioning in the context of Terry stops, Section
287(a)(2) empowers a Border Patrol agent to make warrantless arrests of
two classes of aliens: (1) those actually in the act of entering illegally, and
(2) those other aliens who the agent has “reason to believe” are in the
United States in violation of immigration law and are likely to escape
before arrest warrants can be obtained.73  Finally, Section 287(a)(3) au-
thorizes warrantless vehicle searches “within a reasonable distance” from
the nation’s borders, which is defined by regulation as 100 miles from the
border.74  Although Congress did not intend to incorporate into Section
287(a)(3) a requirement of probable cause,75 the Supreme Court has read
into it a reasonable suspicion requirement as it did with Section
287(a)(1):
68. INA § 287(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1).
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (explaining that “whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person”).
Vehicular traffic stops, like pedestrian stops, are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
70. Terry, 392 U.S. at 37.  The case law is not perfectly fully clear on whether the
“reasonable suspicion” solely goes to alienage (i.e., any person reasonably suspected of
being an alien may be stopped) or whether the agent must also have some rational basis to
think the person is an alien out of status. Id.
71. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.  To the extent the Border Patrol is questioning
someone under circumstances that do not constitute even a Terry-stop type seizure, no
particular level of suspicion is required. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005)
(reaffirming prior precedent holding that mere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2010).
73. Id. § 287.8(a)(3).
74. Id. § 287.1(a)(2).
75. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 877 n.3.
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The effect of our decision is to limit exercise of the authority granted
by both §287(a)(1) and §287(a)(3).  Except at the border and its
functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion
that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.76
Note that a careful reading of the Court’s decision makes clear that the
words “the border” as used in this passage do not mean “the border
area”; rather they reference the actual border.77  The whole point of the
Brignoni-Ponce78 decision is that even in border areas, reasonable suspi-
cion is required.  The net effect of the Brignoni-Ponce decision and its
progeny is the rule that, even in border areas, the Border Patrol must
always have objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity79 prior
to making a Terry-stop type seizure of a suspected alien, whether by vehi-
cle or on foot, regardless of the purported source of the government’s
authority.80
In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a court “must look at the
‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining
officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.”81  The Brignoni-Ponce “reasonable suspicion” factors in-
clude: (1) known characteristics of a particular area, (2) previous experi-
ence of the arresting agents with criminal activity, (3) proximity of the
area to the border, (4) usual traffic patterns of that road, (5) information
about recent illegal trafficking in aliens or narcotics in the area, (6) be-
havior of the vehicle’s driver, (7) appearance of the vehicle, and (8) num-
76. Id. at 884; see also United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir.
2005) (“For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively
reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity . . . occurred, or is about to occur,
before stopping the vehicle.”).  This is the same analysis as applies to Terry stops. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (holding that in order to briefly detain a person for
questioning, an officer needs a reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts).
77. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
78. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
79. Case law seems to indicate that, although the focus of the aforementioned statutes
and regulations is on the Border Patrol’s immigration enforcement authority, the necessary
“reasonable suspicion” may be of any criminal activity. See, e.g., United States. v. Rubio-
Hernandez, 39 F. Supp. 2d 808 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 421–22 (1981), as support for the claim that the Brignoni-Ponce “reasonable suspi-
cion” test was extended to include “criminal activity”).
80. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
81. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at
417).
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ber, appearance, and behavior of the passengers.82  Race and ethnic
appearance, standing alone, do not constitute reasonable suspicion.83
Proximity to the border is a decisive, even indispensable, factor in the
Brignoni-Ponce analysis under Fifth Circuit precedent.  “[I]f there is no
reason to believe that the vehicle has come from the border, the remain-
ing factors must be examined charily.”84  Additionally, “[w]hen the stop
occurs a substantial distance from the border, th[e] element [of proximity
to the border] is missing.”85  Vehicles traveling more than fifty miles from
the border will generally be considered a “substantial distance” from the
border.”86  A concomitant principle to the border proximity rule is that
there should be some evidence that the vehicle recently crossed the
border:
When a person is traveling within our country . . . we are more hesi-
tant to allow interference, even if the vehicle is close to the border.
For this reason, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that one of the
vital elements in the Brignoni-Ponce reasonable suspicion test is
whether the agents had reason to believe that the vehicle in question
recently crossed the border.87
And “[i]f a vehicle is already past towns in this country, the mere fact that
it is proceeding on a public highway leading from the border is not suffi-
cient cause to believe the vehicle came from the border.”88 Of course,
having crossed the border and having come from the border area are not
the same thing.  As between the two concepts, the emphasis appears to
focus on an analysis of whether the vehicle has recently crossed the bor-
der, which makes sense given the Border Patrol’s limited powers to en-
force immigration laws.89
82. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884–85.
83. Id. at 886–87 (noting that “[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican an-
cestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor,” but re-
jecting the officer’s singular reliance on the “apparent Mexican ancestry of the
occupants”).  It is highly doubtful that this proposition still stands thirty-five years after
Brignoni-Ponce, given the number of Hispanic U.S. citizens.  Given the current immigrant
population does one even know what it means to look like a Mexican?
84. United States v. Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2001) (“One of the vital elements in
the reasonable suspicion test is whether the agents had reason to believe that the vehicle in
question recently crossed the border.”).
85. Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d at 380 (citing United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727
F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1984)).
86. Id. (citing United States. v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 722 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994)).
87. United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1984).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Chaparro, 180 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1998) (“A
vital element of the Brignoni-Ponce test is whether the agent had reason to believe that the
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Decades of case law make clear that the roving patrol stops described
at the beginning of this article do not pass constitutional muster.  In
United States v. Rodriguez-Rivas,90 the Fifth Circuit found a Fourth
Amendment violation where the agent stopped the vehicle over fifty
miles from the border just because a five-foot seven-inch-tall defendant
was slouching in his seat.91  In United States v. Ortega-Serrano,92 a vehicle
stop 300 to 400 miles north of the border was deemed improper where it
was based on an uneven paint job and the fact that the vehicle occupants
were Hispanic and appeared “dirty” and “nervous.”93  In United States v.
Lamas,94 the Court held that an agent was not constitutionally justified in
stopping a vehicle 190 miles from the border even though the car was
heavily loaded, had out-of-state plates yet did not appear to be a “typical
tourist’s car,” and the passengers appeared to avoid eye contact with the
agents.95  In United States v. Lopez-Valdez,96 “a midsize sedan traveling
on a road near the U.S.–Mexican border with as many as eight visible
passengers does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of unlawful activ-
ity.”97  And in a more recent decision, United States v. Rangel-Portillo,98
the Fifth Circuit reviewed a stop by Border Patrol agents a mere 500
yards from the border and overturned a wrongful denial of a suppression
motion:
[T]he district court noted that all of the passengers in the vehicle
wore seatbelts, sat rigidly, refrained from talking to one another, and
had no shopping bags [although exiting a Wal-Mart].  This Court,
however, cannot infer reasonable suspicion from these factors since
there is no rational reason to conclude that law-abiding citizens are
less likely to wear their seatbelts or exit a Wal-Mart parking lot sans
shopping bags . . . .  Thus, it is logical to conclude that none of these
factors carry any weight since law-abiding individuals are just as
likely, if not more likely, to wear their seatbelts, sit rigidly, and re-
vehicle in question had come from the border.  It appears manifest that Agent Hollenbeck
did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Moreno had crossed the border.  Moreno
was [sixty] miles north of the Mexican border, driving a pickup truck with valid Texas
license plates, and could have been coming from nearby communities.”); Rodriguez-Rivas,
151 F.3d at 380 (“A stop [sixty] miles from the Mexican border, we have found, was not
near enough to the border to justify a belief that the vehicle originated from the border.”).
90. 151 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1998).
91. Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d at 382, 382 n.3.
92. 788 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1986).
93. United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1986).
94. 608 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1979).
95. United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1979).
96. 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).
97. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).
98. 586 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2009).
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frain from conversing with one another as they exit a Wal-Mart park-
ing lot.99
Of course, there are many reasons why a roving investigatory patrol
stop can quickly escalate to a simple arrest—which would require proba-
ble cause and possibly an arrest warrant—including when a stop is ex-
tended in duration or the person in question is handcuffed.  However, no
analysis of the requirements of probable cause will here be provided be-
cause, in the context of a Border Patrol roving patrol stop, if the agent
does not have an objective “reasonable suspicion” of illegal activity, he
will by definition also not have enough evidence to show probable cause
to make an arrest.
IV. THE PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ENABLE THE BORDER PATROL TO ACT WITH IMPUNITY
The problem and the applicable Fourth Amendment law have been ex-
plained, but to understand the real-world dynamics that enable the Bor-
der Patrol to abuse its power to conduct roving patrols with relative
impunity, we have to understand the surrounding factual and procedural
circumstances.  There are only three kinds of persons that may be seized
in a Border Patrol roving patrol stop: U.S. citizens, non-citizens with legal
status, and undocumented individuals.  In general, the average person,
regardless of citizenship or immigration status, will not have the adequate
means and incentives to assert and defend his or her legal rights after
being unlawfully stopped by the Border Patrol.  This is due to a number
of issues—ignorance of the law, cultural acceptance, fear of the govern-
ment, inadequate legal protections both in removal proceedings and in
civil tort litigation and, of course, financial considerations.  For U.S. citi-
zens or non-citizens with legal status, the only available recourse is an
administrative complaint or a civil lawsuit.100  Good data is lacking on the
number of administrative complaints that have been made arising from
unlawful Border Patrol roving patrol stops or any resulting agency ac-
tion,101 but given the pervasiveness of the tactic, there is no reason to
believe that the Supreme Court was wrong when it stated, as previously
99. United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2009).
100. As with Javier Z. and Luis Pablo P., previously mentioned, most lawsuits in this
context will be brought against the individual agents pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and against the
federal government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sections
1346(b) and 2671.
101. However, in the lawsuit brought by Javier Z., the government claimed in discov-
ery responses that no such complaints had been made against any of the three agents in-
volved in that arrest.
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quoted, that a complaint will have no effect on an individual agent’s
record.
Civil lawsuits are available to all persons regardless of immigration sta-
tus.  However, there are serious hurdles that effectively discourage such
actions.  Lawyers are expensive, especially lawyers who practice law in
federal court.  The average person does not have the money to hire a
lawyer on an hourly basis and the overwhelming majority of lawyers who
litigate tort claims in federal court will not agree to represent a client in a
civil tort suit on a contingency basis where there is no prospect of collect-
ing meaningful monetary damages.  U.S. citizens and non-citizens with
legal status will generally be released by the Border Patrol within a very
short time subsequent to the initial stop, perhaps mere minutes, so fed-
eral courts will likely view their monetary damages as limited, or nominal
at best.  As for non-citizens without status, assuming that there is no out-
standing order of removal102 or other basis for expedited removal,103 the
Border Patrol will either place them in removal proceedings subsequent
to a roving patrol stop or persuade them to depart “voluntarily.”104  If
they accept voluntary departure, the person will be outside the country
within a very short period of time and unable logistically to bring suit as a
practical matter even if inclined to do so.105  If the person is placed in
removal proceedings but later brings a federal civil lawsuit, the govern-
ment will argue that any detention subsequent to the initial patrol stop
was not tortious at all; it was rather a necessary consequence of the per-
son being removable as a non-citizen based on status, regardless of
whether the initial stop was completely legal.  The point is that even in
the best of situations, assuming no other egregious conduct on the part of
the Border Patrol agents, the likelihood of recovering serious monetary
damages will be extremely minimal, thus erasing the financial conditions
necessary to vindicate one’s rights through federal court litigation.  If this
were not enough, to reduce the financial incentive for federal litigation
even more, Congress has codified the rule that a lawyer accepting any
FTCA claim is limited to twenty-five percent of any award.106  The end
102. If the person has an outstanding order of removal, the Border Patrol may “rein-
state” the removal order and remove the person from the United States quickly and with-
out much further due process.  8 C.F.R. § 1241.8 (2010).
103. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225
(2006) (providing for expedited removal of arriving aliens); INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228
(providing for expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing aggravated felonies).
104. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.25 (providing voluntary departure authority).
105. See id. § 1241.33(b) (allowing a seventy-two-hour window from when a final or-
der is issued and when an alien may be physicially deported).
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (2006) (explaining that any person who “charge[s], de-
mand[s], receive[s], or collect[s]” more than twenty-five percent may be subject to a $2,000
fine or be imprisoned for up to one year).
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result here, given minimal damages and a statutory cap on attorneys’ fees,
is that these lawsuits are few and far between.
For non-citizens, and even those with legal status, there are other pow-
erful reasons, entirely distinct from financial considerations that discour-
age lawsuits.  Non-citizens with legal status are extremely reluctant to
bring legal challenges to redress governmental misconduct.  Ignorance of
their rights is pervasive as is obedience to, and fear of, the government,
all of which often stems from their deep cultural roots.  They intuitively,
but rightly, understand the precarious nature of their legal status and the
extent to which their continued maintenance of that status depends on
the deferential exercise of the discretion of the federal government—su-
ing the government in the eyes of most non-citizens is an absurd and sui-
cidal act.
The dynamics with regard to undocumented individuals change some-
what with the introduction of removal proceedings and the prospect of
the person’s physical removal from the country, but the end result is the
same.  When the border patrol arrests someone subsequent to a roving
patrol stop, but is unsuccessful in getting the person to accept voluntary
departure, the person will be put in removal proceedings if eligible.
There are a number of legal ways in which a person in removal proceed-
ings may avoid deportation if he or she meets the oftentimes onerous
legal requirements, but this Article is not concerned with those situations
because such persons are not attempting to vindicate their rights to be
free from an unlawful seizure by government agents.  Rather, they are
simply pursuing other available relief in an attempt to avoid their re-
moval.  As a practical matter, given the difficulty of vindicating their
rights to be free from an unlawful seizure by government agents within
the context of a removal proceeding, as explained below, if the person
has any other means of avoiding removal, that other means is usually a
better course of action, though this also depends on various other factors
such as one’s venue.  Whether he107 can avoid deportation on account of
the illegality of the initial arrest (as happened in the cases of Jose O.,
Damian C., and Israel H., referenced above) is highly doubtful.  Applica-
ble law and procedural rules see to that.  Although this Article is not
meant to be a primer on motions to suppress in removal proceedings, a
brief overview of the process and some of its applicable law and procedu-
ral rules is necessary in order to understand how this Kafka-esque process
helps make it possible for the Border Patrol to act with relative impunity.
107. This pronoun is used for the sake of simplicity and because, as the aforemen-
tioned cases make clear, the Border Patrol appears to target men more so than women
with its roving patrols.
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An alien has a right to be represented in removal proceedings, but not
at the expense of the government.108  So right from the start, there is a
huge financial hurdle to jump—hiring a lawyer.  This is at most times
beyond the reach of your average non-citizen without status in removal
proceedings.  It is safe to say that a non-citizen in removal proceedings
who cannot retain competent counsel will be unaware of the possibility of
litigating the illegality of government conduct as a means of removal de-
fense and, in any case, for reasons that will be clear shortly, they would
certainly be utterly incapable of defending themselves in this manner pro
se.109  Even amongst removal defense lawyers, litigating the illegality of
government conduct as a means of removal defense is a relatively niche
practice.  Pursuing this line of defense has its personal costs: it can be a
highly litigious process; it requires reference to, and application of, ordi-
narily inapplicable criminal and constitutional law; and it can disrupt oth-
erwise congenial relations between a defense lawyer and opposing
counsel and judges because it disrupts the ordinary deportation of people
who are otherwise presumably deportable.110  If the person has the luck
and the means to hire a lawyer capable of properly defending the case,
the entire proceeding will be an evidentiary contest in which, at most, two
issues will be litigated: alienage and the legality of the underlying arrest.
The problem with this contest, however, is that it is overwhelmingly hand-
icapped in favor of the government.
In removal proceedings, the government has the initial burden of dem-
onstrating alienage by “clear, convincing and unequivocal” evidence
when denied by a respondent.111  In this context, as an evidentiary and
practical matter, “alienage” can be summarized as the fact of having been
108. See INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (explaining that in removal proceedings, the per-
son of interest has the privilege to be represented by choosing any attorney they wish as
long as it is at their own expense).
109. There is some authority for the idea that immigration judges have a duty to in-
form respondents as to forms of relief for which they are apparently eligible. See In re
Cordova, 22 I&N Dec. 966, 970–71 (B.I.A. 1999) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a)(2) (1998))
(explaining that those who are eligible for voluntary departure must be informed).  How-
ever, immigration judges are under considerable pressure to move their cases along. See
Daniel Gonzalez, Immigration Cases Flooding U.S. Courts, Experts Say Judges Pressured,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 16, 2012, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/
2010/02/14/20100214immigrationcourts.html (explaining that even a brief pause in each
case involving a person charged with entry without inspection to inquire into the circum-
stances of the respondent’s arrest may be considered untenable).
110. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048–49 (1984) (explaining that “[t]he
ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all levels has an
adverse impact on the effective administration of the immigration laws”) (quoting In re
Sandoval, 17 I&N Dec. 70, 80 (B.I.A. 1979)).
111. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 281, 285 (1966).
2012] BORDER PATROL 571
born abroad112 because any evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebut-
table presumption of alienage.113  This means that once the government
succeeds in proving up the respondent’s foreign birth by admissible evi-
dence, whether connected to the underlying arrest or not, the burden
then shifts to the respondent to prove he is not an alien or that he is an
alien here in lawful status.114  At that point, if the respondent has no
other relief from removal, the case is lost (assuming no successful appeal)
and the legality of the underlying arrest ceases to be an issue of continu-
ing relevance to the immigration court.  One more illegal border patrol
stop will have gone unremedied.
The government can demonstrate alienage in any number of ways.  The
common forms of evidence used are the Form I-213, testimony from the
respondent himself, and preexisting immigration records relating to the
respondent.  Government counsel often attempts to introduce the Form
I-213 as evidence of alienage because, if not contradicted, an immigration
judge will have to consider it inherently trustworthy and admissible as
evidence to prove alienage.115  Recall that the Form I-213 is the form that
an immigration agent fills out after an alien is arrested and is supposed to
identify, inter alia, the basis of the government’s encounter with the per-
son arrested.  It also usually contains statements made by the examining
officer attesting to the respondent having said that he or she was born in
Mexico.  The downside from the government’s perspective of using the I-
213 is that it opens the door to questions about the legality of the under-
lying arrest.  That is a door that government counsel works vigorously to
keep shut.
The easiest way for the government to prevent any inquiry into the
underlying arrest is to avoid using the I-213 altogether and to rely instead
on other evidence of alienage, such as the respondent’s own testimony,
prior immigration records, or other documentation of alienage.116  Any
112. While one can certainly be born abroad and still be a U.S. citizen, whether, for
example, derivatively or by naturalization, a person who is a U.S. citizen but was not born
in the United States would not be litigating the illegality of government conduct as a means
of removal defense.  He or she would just prove his or her citizenship.
113. See In re Benitez, 19 I&N Dec. 173, 177 (B.I.A. 1984) (explaining that “in depor-
tation proceedings there is no presumption of citizenship similar to the presumption of
innocence which exists in criminal cases”); In re Leyva, 16 I&N Dec. 118, 119 (B.I.A. 1977)
(allowing a 1964 visa to serve as evidence of birth in Mexico, because it contained a picture
that bared a resemblance to the respondent, which sufficiently created a presumption of
alienage).
114. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006).
115. In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I&N Dec. 784, 785 (B.I.A. 1999).
116. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984). (“[R]egardless of how
the arrest is effected, deportation will still be possible when evidence not derived directly
from the arrest is sufficient to support deportation.”); In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I&N Dec.
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voluntary statement made by the respondent in removal proceedings im-
plicating alienage will suffice to carry the government’s initial burden of
proof, making the illegality of the underlying arrest irrelevant.117  How-
ever, an illegal entry is a criminal act,118 and any person that entered
illegally has the right to refuse to answer any questions that would impli-
cate him or herself in that act.  The privilege against self-incrimination
“not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a convic-
tion under a federal criminal statute, but likewise embraces those which
would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant for a federal crime.”119  Although removal proceedings are ad-
ministrative and the respondent is not being criminally charged, the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination extends to administrative
proceedings.120  If the government succeeds in getting the respondent to
admit alienage or to say something that implicates alienage, the case is
over and the Border Patrol’s illegal conduct becomes irrelevant.
If the government is unsuccessful in eliciting testimony from the re-
spondent implicating alienage, they can use any admissible and preexist-
ing immigration records relating to the respondent to prove alienage.  In
United States v. Herrera-Ochoa,121 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an immigration file need not be suppressed even if there was an ille-
gal arrest because the person does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the file and therefore has no standing to challenge its introduc-
tion into evidence.122  This means that if the respondent has any prior
immigration history, regardless of the nature of that history,123 the gov-
ernment will be able to introduce the records without complaint from the
respondent as evidence of alienage, the case will be lost, the legality of
the underlying arrest will no longer be of any relevance to the immigra-
351, 353 (B.I.A.1996) (holding that independently obtained evidence of alienage will suf-
fice to prove alienage regardless of an alien’s illegal arrest).
117. See In re Carrillo, 17 I&N Dec. 30, 32-33 (B.I.A. 1979) (finding that the voluntary
statement given at the hearing rendered unnecessary the inadmissible testimony obtained
in violation of Fifth Amendment right to remain silent).
118. INA §§ 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325 (2006) (outlining procedures for alien regis-
tration, penalties for failure to register, and penalties for improper entry).
119. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
120. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) ([T]he Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination . . . can be asserted in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory”); see also In re Car-
rillo, 17 I&N Dec. at 33 (affirming the privilege against self-incrimination in removal
proceedings).
121. 245 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
122. United States v. Herrera-Ochoa, 245 F.3d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 2001).
123. For example, the respondent may have been the beneficiary of a visa petition
that was filed by a parent years past.
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tion court, and one more illegal border patrol stop will have gone
unremedied.
If the government has no preexisting immigration records relating to
the respondent, they will often use the information taken by the Border
Patrol to obtain the respondent’s foreign birth certificate or other such
evidence of identity.124  Then, in court, the government will argue that,
regardless of whether the arrest was illegal and regardless of whether
they obtained the identity documents by means of biographical data
taken as a result of the arrest, biographical data is part of that person’s
“identity” and “identity” cannot be suppressed.  Government counsel re-
peats ad nauseam the mantra that the “identity” of an alien is never itself
suppressible as if this suffices to satisfy any and all concerns about the
origin of the documents and whether they relate to the respondent.  It
seems to this author that this position misrepresents the case law and
confuses the relevant issues, but it is nevertheless highly persuasive to
immigration judges.125  If the government is successful with this tactic
124. For Mexicans, the government will often obtain the Clave U´nica de Registro de
Poblacio´n, or Unique Population Registry Code, a unique alphanumerical identity code
assigned by the Mexican government to all citizens and residents of Mexico.  The code is
readily available on the internet. See Orientacio´n para tra´mite de la Curp, CURP MEXICO,
http://curp.troyaestrategias.com/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).  For a detailed dis-
cussion of the difficulty of proving citizenship through the use of foreign birth certificates
see Lee J. Tera´n, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and Other Tales of Chal-
lenges to Asserting Acquired U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR __ (2012).
125. In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court, considered two consolidated cases in-
volving two unrelated but similarly situated aliens—Respondents Lopez-Mendoza and
Sandoval-Sanchez.  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).  The Court, af-
firming prior law, held that “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a
criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as the fruit of an unlawful arrest,
even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest . . . occurred.” Id. at 1039.  The problem was
that “[a]t his deportation hearing, [Respondent] Lopez-Mendoza objected only to the fact
that he had been summoned to a deportation hearing following an unlawful arrest; he
entered no objection to the evidence offered against him.” Id. at 1040.  Just as a criminal
defendant cannot escape a criminal court’s jurisdiction on account of an illegal arrest (al-
though such a person could avail himself of the exclusionary rule), an alien’s arrest, which
may have been illegal, nonetheless has no bearing on whether a subsequent deportation
hearing can be brought against that person. Id. In other words, the illegal arrest does not
affect the immigration court’s in personam jurisdiction over the respondent. See, e.g.,
Huerta-Cabrera v. INS, 466 F.2d 759, 761 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972) (“Even if the arrest were
illegal, the mere fact that the authorities got the ‘body’ of Huerta-Cabrera illegally does
not make the proceeding prosecuting him or deporting him the fruit of the poisoned
tree.”).  By contrast, Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez had “a more substantial claim [be-
cause h]e objected not to his compelled presence at a deportation proceeding, but to evi-
dence offered at that proceeding.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040.  When government
counsel argues that a respondent cannot refuse to identify his date or place of birth or that
a respondent cannot object to the government using biographical data taken at the time of
the illegal arrest to obtain other evidence of alienage because “identity cannot be sup-
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then, once again, the illegality of the government’s conduct becomes ir-
relevant, the case is lost, and the Border Patrol succeeds in parlaying its
violation of the law into one more person deported.
If the government has to rely on the Form I-213 because it is unable to
use the respondent’s own testimony, prior immigration records, other
documentation, or some other means to prove alienage, then and only
then, will the illegality of the Border Patrol’s arrest become relevant.
Where the government seeks to introduce into evidence the I-213, the
burden falls to the respondent and his lawyer to object to its admission
and to make a prima facie case that the evidence contained in the I-213—
namely the respondent’s statements implicating himself as a non-citizen
to the Border Patrol agent—was obtained by the government in an egre-
giously illegal manner and therefore should be excluded from the record.
A person in removal proceedings “who raises the claim questioning the
legality of the evidence must come forward with proof establishing a
prima facie case before the [government] will be called on to assume the
burden of justifying the manner in which it obtained the evidence.”126
Putting it in other terms, this rule basically means that it falls to the re-
spondent to lay a foundation for the government’s evidence rather than
the other way around.
One basis for the exclusion of evidence obtained by law enforcement
misconduct is an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Never-
theless, despite the fact that we previously described at some length how
Border Patrol roving stops often violate the Fourth Amendment, neither
the Fourth Amendment (and its applicable judicial exclusionary rule),
nor strict evidentiary rules ordinarily apply in removal proceedings.127
pressed,” they are conflating and confusing a challenge to the court’s in personam jurisdic-
tion, which the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza stated in not permissible, with a
challenge to illegally obtained evidence, which the Lopez-Mendoza Court did not fore-
close, even in removal proceedings.  A respondent in proceedings bringing a motion to
suppress and exclude illegally obtained evidence is not objecting to his being compelled to
come forth and defend himself against the government’s charge of alienage; he is simply
objecting to the government’s use of illegally obtained evidence.  They are two separate
objections entirely.  One is proper; one is not.  The Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts have
affirmed this reading of Lopez-Mendoza on this issue; “the ‘identity’ language in Lopez-
Mendoza refers only to jurisdiction over a defendant and it does not apply to evidentiary
issues pertaining to the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest and
challenged in a criminal proceeding.” United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104,
1112 (10th Cir. 2006).  “[T]he [Lopez-Mendoza] Court’s reference to the suppression of
identity appears to be tied only to a jurisdictional issue, not to an evidentiary issue.”
United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 2001).
126. In re Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611-12 (B.I.A. 1988).
127. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (holding by a five to four margin that
the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in removal proceedings to evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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Fortunately, and for the time being, all persons in the United States are
entitled to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.128  For evi-
dence to be admissible in removal proceedings it must be probative and
“its use fundamentally fair so as to not deprive respondents of due pro-
cess of law as mandated by the [F]ifth [A]mendment.”129  As explained
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA):
Every [F]ourth [A]mendment violation will not of necessity result in
a finding that the admission of resulting evidence is fundamentally
unfair.  The circumstances surrounding an arrest and interrogation,
however, may in some cases render evidence inadmissible under the
due process clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment.  [Thus,] . . . cases
may arise in which the manner of seizing evidence is so egregious
that to rely on it would offend the [F]ifth [A]mendment’s due pro-
cess requirement of fundamental fairness.130
The “egregious” misconduct sufficient to warrant suppression of result-
ing evidence need not entail grotesque or criminal behavior or excessive
force or other such self-evidently offensive misconduct by officers.
Searches and arrests by immigration agents that violate clearly estab-
lished Fourth Amendment principles should constitute egregious miscon-
duct under the due process standard.131  This explains why now, when
128. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (agreeing that the INS policy vio-
lated petitioner’s equal protection rights).
129. In re Toro, 17 I&N Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980).
130. Id.; see In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 325, 327 (B.I.A. 1980) (“[S]uch a viola-
tion [of regulatory requirements] may lead to a finding of inadmissibility under certain
circumstances.”); In re Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 319, 321 (B.I.A. 1980) (“[T]he respondent’s
admissions which underlie the finding of deportability were involuntarily made and that
the requirements of due process warrant their exclusion from the record.”).  Although to
date only the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have expressly affirmed that the exclu-
sionary rule applies in immigration proceedings for egregious Fourth Amendment viola-
tions, see Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2010) (employing the Lopez-
Mendoza analysis in determining whether to exclude evidence); Almeida-Amaral v. Gon-
zales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the exclusionary rule applies if it is estab-
lished “either (a) that an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred,
or (b) that the violation . . . undermined the reliability of the evidence . . . .”); Gonzalez-
Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the level of “egregiousness” of
conduct necessary for the exclusionary rule to apply).  No other circuit court has rejected
it.
131. See In re Toro, 17 I&N. Dec. at 342–43 (finding that “persons may not be stopped
and questioned on the street by immigration officers absent a reasonable suspicion that
they are aliens”).  In In re Toro, it was precisely because the officers acted in good faith, in
conformity with government policy, and without the guidance of established law (which
came later with the Supreme Court decision in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)),
that their violation of the Fourth Amendment was excused and the evidence obtained
thereby was deemed admissible. Id. at 343–44.
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immigration officers stop a vehicle based solely on the racial appearance
of the passengers, the stop will be deemed an egregious violation of the
Fourth Amendment and, thus, provide grounds to apply the exclusionary
rule in immigration proceedings.132 Another basis for the exclusion of
evidence obtained by law enforcement misconduct is that the evidence
was obtained in violation of the agency’s governing regulations.  It is well
settled that regulations promulgated by a federal agency, which affect the
rights and interests of others, are controlling upon the agency.133  Be-
cause constitutional violations will also in many instances necessarily be
acts taken in violation of the applicable statutes and regulations men-
tioned previously, suppression may also be appropriate, therefore, under
the administrative exclusionary rule as applied by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals where the Border Patrol violates regulations promulgated
for a noncitizen’s benefit and the non-citizen suffers prejudice.134
The initial prima facie case establishing a basis for exclusion of the evi-
dence is usually satisfied with a sworn affidavit outlining the illegal arrest
in conjunction with the respondent’s testimony to the same subject.135
This is where things get tricky.  The respondent has to testify about the
illegal arrest but he has to do it without implicating alienage.  Of course,
one huge and essential aspect of the illegal arrest was the conversation
between the Border Patrol agent and the respondent just after being pul-
led over in which the respondent invariably answered the Border Patrol
agent’s questions about immigration status.  And, once the respondent
takes the stand, government counsel is going to ask the respondent point-
edly about what he said to the Border Patrol agent.  The respondent can
of course plead his constitutional right against self-incrimination if he
knows when and how to do so, but the entire process promises to be
extremely unnerving and confusing.  Predictably, government counsel is
going to ask him all kinds of questions having nothing whatsoever to do
with his arrest but having every potential to implicate alienage.  The re-
spondent’s position is untenable; he must vindicate his Fourth Amend-
132. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1452; see Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 237 (“[W]ere
there evidence that the stop was based on race, the violation would be egregious, and the
exclusionary rule would apply.”).
133. See e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954)
(holding that regulations have the force of law when dealing with deportation
proceedings).
134. See In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I&N Dec. at 327 (noting that a rigid rule has yet to
emerge “under which every violation of an agency regulatory requirement results in the
invalidation of all subsequent agency action or the exclusion of evidence from administra-
tive proceedings”).
135. See In re Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that an affidavit
standing alone is insufficient to prosecute a motion to suppress; testimony is absolutely
necessary to defend the motion).
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ment right to be free from unreasonable warrantless seizures by fully
explaining what happened without giving up his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination by fully explaining what happened.  Criminal
courts long ago realized the absurdity of this situation136—being forced to
sacrifice one constitutional right in order to vindicate another—but, in
immigration court, the respondent is not entitled to a suppression hearing
that is separate and apart from removal proceedings.137  So anything the
respondent says at any time can and will be used against him.
There is one final obstacle to the vindication of a respondent’s Fourth
Amendment rights in removal proceedings worth mentioning before
moving on: the “detention” of the respondent subsequent to his arrest.  A
non-citizen arrested for immigration violations has no constitutional right
to release on bond.138  However, he may be released on bond or on his
own recognizance139 if not subject to mandatory detention due to crimi-
nal or terrorist grounds.140  If the respondent is not given a bond subse-
quent to his arrest or is given a bond that he cannot afford to post, then
the respondent, if statutorily eligible, will have to seek a bond order from
an immigration judge.141  Immigration courts have wide discretion to de-
termine whether a respondent should be released on bond142 but, in gen-
eral, the judge will base the bond decision on whether the respondent has
demonstrated that he is not a threat to national security or a risk of
flight.143  There is no exhaustive list of relevant factors but the factors
commonly considered by immigration judges in making bond decisions
136. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, (1968) (“[W]hen a defendant
testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issues of guilt unless
he makes no objection.”).
137. See In re Benitez, 19 I&N Dec. 173, 175 (B.I.A. 1984) (stating that there is no
statutory or regulatory right to a separate suppression hearing in deportation proceedings);
In re Bulos, 15 I&N Dec. 645, 646–47 (B.I.A. 1976) (raising but not ruling on whether
evidence in connection with a suppression motion may be considered in determining the
issue of the respondent’s removability).
138. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542 (1952) (“The refusal of bail in [deporta-
tion] cases is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of power.”).
139. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA) § 236(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(2) (2006).
140. INA § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).
141. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2010) (providing for bond redeterminations and appeals
from immigration judge determinations).
142. See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 540–41 (deciding that the standard for determining an
abuse of the Attorney General’s discretion will be “where it is clearly shown that it ‘was
without a reasonable foundation’”); United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director of
INS, 491 F.2d 573, 577–78 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[A]n alien has a heavy burden to establish that
the Attorney General abused his discretion.”).
143. In re Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102, 1103 (B.I.A. 1999); In re Patel, 15 I&N Dec.
666, 666 (B.I.A. 1976).
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include whether the person has a fixed address in the United States,
length of residence in the United States, family ties in the United States,
employment history, criminal record, history of immigration violations,
and manner of entry to the United States.144
Most immigration courts use a form bond application which requires
the respondent to provide supporting documentation including proof of
identification if such proof is not already in the hands of the government.
Although bond proceedings are separate from removal proceedings,145 if
the respondent denies alienage in the removal proceeding, government
counsel will use in the removal case whatever identification or bond doc-
uments the respondent provides in the bond case that implicates alien-
age.146  Government counsel will also use whatever information the
respondent provides in his bond package to go out and get other evidence
of alienage.  If he provides a date of birth, for example, government
counsel may use it to obtain the client’s birth certificate from the home
country or other forms of documentation of birth abroad.147  The bottom
line is that it is difficult for a respondent to seek a bond order and obtain
his liberty from an immigration judge without prejudicing his ability to
defend the removal case on the basis of the illegality of the underlying
arrest.  And as any practitioner, whether of removal defense or criminal
defense, can attest; it is exponentially more difficult to defend a case
when the client is incarcerated.  All the ordinary pressures, financial and
otherwise, are magnified and the average person, who has no relief other
than to litigate the illegality of the underlying arrest, will not defend his
case if it means prolonged incarceration.  He will simply give up the fight
and yet another illegal Border Patrol stop will go unnoticed.
144. In re Saelee, 22 I&N Dec. 1258, 1262 (B.I.A. 2000); In re Andrade, 19 I&N Dec.
488, 490 (B.I.A. 1987).
145. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) reads, in pertinent part: “Consideration by the Immigration
Judge of an application or request of a respondent regarding custody or bond under this
section shall be separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or
removal hearing or proceeding.”
146. See In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I&N Dec. 351, 353 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to documents voluntarily submitted by respondent to the
government).
147. See the discussion of Unique Population Registry Code for Mexicans, supra note
124.  Of course, the government will already have respondent’s date of birth because it will
be part of the information taken upon arrest.  Nevertheless, if the respondent submits that
information in his bond packet, then he will be giving the government an independent
source of that information untainted by the illegal arrest.
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V. ONE SUGGESTED MODEST JUDICIAL MODIFICATION TO MITIGATE
THE DAMAGE
There is no panacea to this problem.  But there is one judicial measure
that has not been tried that might help keep the Border Patrol in its place
or, at a minimum, mitigate some of the resulting damage.  The time has
come for separate suppression hearings. In In re Benitez,148 issued shortly
after Lopez-Mendoza, the B.I.A. issued an opinion that was hostile to, if
not derisive of, the idea of excluding evidence due to the illegality of the
government’s conduct by which it was obtained.149  Mr. Benitez, through
counsel, had sought from the immigration court a separate hearing in
which to litigate his motion to suppress.150  This request was denied and,
during his hearings, he admitted alienage.151  In upholding the denial of a
separate suppression hearing, the Board stated that “[n]either the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, the regulations, nor case law gives a respon-
dent the right to a separate hearing on a motion to suppress evidence,” as
if that were the end of the analysis.152  This statement is mostly accurate,
but certainly not dispositive, as the Board did not consider the obvious
question of whether constitutional due process requires a separate
hearing.
As mentioned, immigration removal proceedings must comport with
constitutional due process standards of fundamental fairness.153  “The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”154  This fundamental
due process requirement is reflected in the immigration judge’s explicit
duty to dispassionately consider all relevant evidence155 and in the re-
148. 19 I&N Dec. 173 (B.I.A. 1984).
149. In re Benitez, 19 I&N Dec. 173, 174–75 (B.I.A. 1984) (upholding the immigration
judge’s decision to deny Benitez’s request to suppress the evidence).
150. Id. at 174.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 175.
153. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
152 (1945) (stating that the Fifth Amendment does not designate between citizens and
non-citizens).
154. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (explaining that the
due process clause forbids the state from “deport[ing an alien] without giving him all op-
portunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United
States”).
155. See Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA) § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1) (2006) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths . . . [and] receive evi-
dence . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c) (2010) (“The immigration judge shall receive and con-
sider material and relevant evidence . . . .”).
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spondent’s right to present evidence on his own behalf and to examine
the evidence against him.156  While the Board and immigration courts will
generally not rule on constitutional issues,157 they may entertain due pro-
cess and fundamental fairness challenges to procedures as applied,158 and
can entertain due process challenges that can be corrected administra-
tively.159  There is nothing in the INA, the regulations, or case law that
prohibits a separate suppression hearing.  Even Benitez stopped short of
prohibiting immigration courts from holding separate suppression hear-
ing.  And “immigration judges . . . may take any action consistent with
their authorities under the [INA] and regulations that is appropriate and
necessary for the disposition of [removal] cases.”160
Given this backdrop of due process rights designed to ensure a fair
hearing, it is no major mental leap to conclude that it is necessary and
appropriate to hold separate suppression hearings.  As explained above,
the respondent has the burden of making a prima facie case that his arrest
was an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment or violated the Bor-
der Patrol’s governing statutes and regulations and he has the burden of
testifying to the same.  And yet, under current law, as applied, he must do
so while simultaneously withholding vital information about what tran-
spired between him and the Border Patrol agent where necessary to
avoid self-incrimination, information that is clearly relevant, even neces-
sary, to a determination on the ultimate question of law.  “Constitutional
protections are meaningless if a respondent cannot present evidence of
their violation except at his or her own peril.”161  This is why for over
forty years the law has been that testimony given by a defendant in a
criminal proceeding in support of a motion to suppress evidence on
Fourth Amendment grounds cannot thereafter be admitted against him at
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence.162  If the law were otherwise, the
defendant would have to choose between enforcing his Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable and warrantless seizures and
156. INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(b) (“[T]he alien shall have a reason-
able opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the
alien’s own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government . . . .”).
157. See In re Fuentes-Campos, 21 I&N Dec. 905, 912 (B.I.A. 1997) (“It is well settled
that we lack jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the Act and the regulations we
administer.”); In re U.M., 20 I&N Dec. 327, 334 (B.I.A. 1991) (“It is not within the prov-
ince of the Board to pass upon the constitutionality of the statutes it administers.”).
158. In re Toro, 17 I&N Dec. 340, 343 (1980).
159. See Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1183 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1989) (noting that the court
could not consider the due process claim because it “[was] not properly raised.”).
160. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).
161. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1968).
162. See id. at 393-94 (discussing the tension between the right to not self-incriminate
and the need to establish standing under the Fourth Amendment).
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preserving his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; seeking
to preserve one constitutional right at the expense of another.  This is an
“intolerable” situation.163  The rationale of Simmons164 applies with
equal force with regard to removal proceedings.  A respondent in re-
moval proceedings either has a right to fundamental fairness or he does
not.  The law as currently applied is untenable but slow to change.  The
very reasons previously identified for why respondents so rarely success-
fully litigate the illegality of government conduct as a means of removal
defense are the same reasons why the issue so rarely comes up for judicial
review.  It is time for removal defense lawyers to push the issue, to press
the case, and to push back against government misconduct.  It is time to
insist upon separate suppression hearings.
163. Id. at 394.
164. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

